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1 What's a formal logical system? 
A formal axiomatised theory, as set out by Peter Smith[l], has three components: 
a formalised language, a decidable set of axioms, and a formalised proof-system. 
The language must consist of a finite set of symbols and have a defined syntax, 
according to which it is decidable what is a term or sentence of the language. 
The set of axioms will be a subset of the set of sentences constructable in the 
language, and it needs to be decidable what's an axiom. We must have a 
proof system whereby we can derive theorems from the axioms, and it must be 
decidable whether a given array of sentences does indeed constitute a proof in 
the theory. 
2 What do we do with formal theories? 
In the broader context, formal theories enable us to very precisely reason about 
reason. It is possible to strip away the distracting semantic consequences of our 
thoughts and arguments, and look to see what all arguments have in common. 
In a narrower context, formal systems serve as useful models of aspects of our 
world that we can learn from. It is possible to build on our deductions and to 
see the sometimes novel and counter-intuitive conclusions our reasoning can lead 
us to. Alonzo Church, Andrey Markov, and Alan Thring independently created 
formal (equivalent) models of computation, long before the rise of the personal 
computer, which eloquently tell us exactly where we don't need to waste the 
resources of the human race, for example, solving the Halting Problem, or any 
other problem which is equivalent to it, of which there are many. Formal theories 
enable us to reason about reason, and to reason about the world. 
2.1 What is negation-completeness of a theory? 
A theory in which it is decidable about every sentence expressible in the language 
of the theory whether that sentence is a theorem of the system, i.e. the theory 
must either prove p or 'P for every p, would be considered negation-complete. 
1 
3 What did Godel prove? 
Godel proved in his historic 1931 paper that a formal system with these three 
desirable properties cannot be negation complete: 
1. The law of the excluded middle. 
2. The Law of Non-Contradiction. 
3. A primitive recursive definition of provability. 
Godel developed a method of encoding statements that we call today Godel 
Numbering, whereby he was able to effectively translate sentences in the lan-
guage of the system he was talking about into statements of the the language 
itself. By a clever trick using the primitive recursive functions, he was then 
able to translate sentences in the system's metalanguage into sentences of the 
language, effectively causing the system to talk about itself. Using this method, 
he constructed what we now call a Godel Sentence, which essentially says "this 
statement is unprovable". This showed that theories with the aforementioned 
properties will always have sentences which, while appearing true and coherent 
from the outside, cannot be derived either in their assertive or negative form 
using the proof-system of the theory. 
3.1 Why might we want the Law of the Excluded Middle? 
The Law of the Excluded Middle, p V 'P, simply asserts that every question 
has an answer, and that such answers must be taken from the realm of values 
available to a logical theory. Classically, these values are true and false, al-
though the law could be extended to cover the requirements of a many-valued 
logic. Since the disjunction is inclusive, this axiom does not classically rule out 
the possibility of both p and 'P being given the same value. 
3.2 Why might we want the Law of Non-Contradiction? 
The Law of Non-Contradiction prima facie seems to be a perfectly reasonable 
assumption about the way things should work. Intuitively, every statement is 
true or false, and no statement should be both true and false. For example, take 
the statement "I am in the room," it seems clear that it has one answer and one 
answer only. Formal systems, however, give us the ability to reason beyond our 
intuitions of how things should work, and to explicitly put our intuitions aside 
and study a system as it actually is. Logic is a science. 
3.2.1 Why might we want to look at the alternative of excluding the 
Law of Non-Contradiction from consideration? 
The Law of Non-Contradiction, classically, gives rise to the Principle of Explo-
sion, p 1\ 'P -+ q, the consequence of any contradiction being reached. This 
statement, which is typically understood to mean "if the logic is false, anything 
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is true" seems the prime justification for including the Law of Non-Contradiction 
in a logical theory. Theories which exclude the Principle of Explosion are called 
Paraconsistent Logics. 
Many people have given good accounts of the motivations for studying a 
paraconsistent logic. Priest and Routley[5] say that since there are interesting, 
non-trivial, paraconsistent theories, the study of a paraconsistent reasoning is 
a necessity to understand them. An inconsistent database is often cited as an 
example of such a system, or the wave-particle duality of quantum mechanics. 
The move to construct Logics of Relevance in which the statement "the 
moon is made of green cheese, therefore it is either raining or not in Ecuador"[9] 
is not a valid inference because the consequent is simply not relevant to the 
antecedent, necessarily excludes the Principle of Explosion. I find the argument 
from relevance to be the more moving of the two, since it could conceivably be 
a matter of some debate as to the actual existence of interesting inconsistent 
physical or logical systems. 
3.3 Why might we want a recursive definition of proof? 
In considering the provability of statements to be a purely syntactic endeavour, 
accomplished only through the manipulation of symbols according to the rules 
of the theory, we give ourselves an explicit definition of proof. In being so 
explicit, we free ourselves from the liability of needing to consider the semantic 
consequences of the system in order to be able to tell what the system says. If a 
sentence is derivable through a purely mechanical application of system's rules 
of inference to the axioms and theorems of the system, then there is no room 
for uncertainty, and no need for recourse to the potentially troubling notion of 
truth. 
4 Primitive recursive functions 
More central to the notion of incompleteness than specific axioms seems to be 
the definition of proof as a primitive recursive function. A primitive recursive 
function is a function that is defined either by recursion or by the composition of 
other p.r. functions. For example, the addition function is recursively defined in 
terms itself, and is composed with the successor function S(x) and the identity 
function(=): 
x+O=x 
x + Sy = S(x + y) 
Classically, it is provable that in any (classical) theory in which the successor, 
addition, and multiplication functions can be defined, barring some axiom which 
forbids it, all other primitive recursive functions can be defined. If all other p.r. 
functions can be constructed in a theory, then in particular the characteristic 
function can be defined. The characteristic function is simply a function which 
partitions a domain into two sets: the objects with a particular property, and the 
objects without the property. It is from this function that p.r. properties and 
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relations can be defined, and it is in this way Godel constructed the provability 
relation which is the basis for the Godel sentence ''this statement is not provable". 
5 Paraconsistent Reasoning 
A classical line of reasoning, starts from some sentences (premises) and proceeds 
by transforming sentences by applying the rules of inference. If a contradiction 
is reached and all the transformations occurred via valid applications of the 
rules, then the premises are deemed to be inconsistent and the line of reasoning 
halts. 
A paraconsistent line of reasoning, however, would utilise the fact that there's 
still an unbroken line of truth, from the premises to the contradiction, and be 
able to continue through the contradiction and see what is capable of being 
drawn out. 
Meyer claims[8] that since all Peano Arithmetic theorems are theorems of 
the theory R#, and the entire set of primitive recursive functions are capturable 
in PA, R# contains all the primitive recursive functions, and is therefore subject 
to the construction of a Godel sentence, and hence negation-incomplete. From 
this conclusion it seems that even paraconsistent theories which hope to perform 
arithmetic are subject to Godel's Incompleteness Theorem. 
As I have outlined above, not even the ability to introduce a contradiction 
into the definitional chain of p.r. functions to a paraconsistent theory through 
the addition of some limiting axiom would be able to prevent the construction 
of the full chain of p.r. functions, as while there would both be and not be 
some functions, there would still be those functions. At the final interesting 
level, we'll either be able to construct a Godel sentence, or we will be able to 
construct both the sentence and its negation, although how we are to interpret 
that result is unclear. 
The last real hope against incompleteness is that there may be some problem 
in defining the primitive recursive functions themselves, due to a fundamental 
inability to express them with the paraconsistent connectives. At this time 
Zach Webber of Otago University is working on that project; preliminary results 
suggest the p.r. functions are indeed constructable. 
6 Further Inquiry 
6.1 The Law of the Excluded Middle in multi-valued logic 
A theory is said to be sound if its logic is truth-preserving. This means that 
any transformation of a true statement using the rules of inference along a line 
of reasoning must result in another true statement. Soundness is generally a 
property of two-valued logics, although the concept does generalise to multi-
valued logics. Ignoring the notion of truth, what is really being propagated is 
the value assigned to a given statement. In Mortensen's RM3[4] those values 
4 
would be true, false, or both (RM3 is a paraconsistent theory). In a four-
valued logic, it's natural to denote the fourth value as neither. 
With respect to multi-valued logics, it seems a more complete account of 
incompleteness should be the inability for a logical system to give a value to 
some expressible statement. A four valued LEM may well be better expressed 
as provable, the negation is provable, both the negation and the as-
sertion are provable, and neither. In such an inconsistent system it would 
be derivable that neither a statement nor its negation were able to be given a 
value by the system. It may of course be that the both and neither values 
are more properly meta-values, but that consideration is certainly beyond the 
scope of this paper. 
6.2 Wff is not a real property 
Another related line of thought concerns the Provability relation and its con-
stituent relation, Wff (for well-formed formula). It seems to me that Wff is a 
nonsensical predicate, for two reasons: 
1. Every sentence in the language is Wff. This is true by definition, since a 
string of symbols is not a sentence in the language unless it conforms to 
the syntactical rules of the language, in other words, it's well-formed. 
2. The sentence -,Wjf('P) is classically unconstructable. It is simply not 
possible to substitute 'P with anything that would yield a true sentence, 
since anything substituted for 'P is by definition well-formed. 
The Provability predicate may still be constructed by ignoring the Wff compo-
nent, however, since it always returns "yes". It may be possible to construct 
a theory in which the language was the closure of the alphabet, and had ax-
ioms concerning the structure of sentences the theory was interested in ex-
amining (wffs). Then the Wff predicate (of a sort) would certainly apply (if 
constructable), and since the theory would know the rules for construction of 
sentences, it would know the rules of the characteristic function (hidden deep 
inside) which would enable the construction of a provability predicate which 
wouldn't need to rely upon information being fed into the system from outside 
as I will describe below. 
6.3 The applicability of the Characteristic Function in 
terms of primitive recursion 
It seems to me that there is a fundamental difference between a p.r. function 
like addition and the characteristic function. I understand the characteristic 
function is decidable, or rather, any property we care to characterise is theo-
retically decidable. It's decidable what's a proof because it's decidable what's 
a wff. How is it decidable what's a wff, though? We decide, and tell the sys-
tem though the characteristic function. The theory PA can quite easily decide 
whether 2+2=4 or not. A theory like PA is incapable of even representing a 
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non-wff, so it cannot make decisions about what is or is not a wff. It seems to me 
no surprise that having handed the system information it would not otherwise 
be in possession of, we encounter an area further down the logical stream where 
the system again cannot make a decision. 
If the characteristic function is only provably p.r. from the bottom up, by 
proving it's decidable and computable with a bounded search (and that all such 
functions are p.r.), then perhaps there may be two classes of p.r. functions. If it 
is indeed provable from the top down, i.e. that the characteristic function itself is 
p. r., via the construction of its definitional chain showing how it is defined from 
the initial functions through primitive recursion and composition, then perhaps 
as I have suggested above all that is needed is to give the deciding ability to the 
theory, by including in its axioms the syntactic rules of the sentences you are 
interested in examining. 
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